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ABSTRACT
The following study on the International Trade Center Curacao
(ITC) was submitted to the World Trade Centers Association as
part of a joint analysis of five World Trade Centers. The
joint analysis was performed by five graduate students at the
Center for Real Estate at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. Amsterdam, Taipei, New York, and Portland (Oregon)
represent the other World Trade Center sites studied. A
comparison and contrast analysis among the five sites was used
to arrive at a series of conclusions for this study, including
the identification of the major characteristics necessary for
the successful development and operation of a World Trade
Center.
Specifically, this paper answers two basic questions regarding
the International Trade Center Curacao. First, are tenants in
World Trade Centers willing to enter into rental agreements on
terms more favorable to the landlord, i.e. rental premiums, as
a result of the unique services and ammenities provided by the
World Trade Centers Association? Secondly, is the enhancement
of the International Trade Center Curacao's rental income
stream sufficient to compensate the owner/developer for any
additional investment necessary to operate the ITC? The
results of this study reveal that tenants in the ITC pay a
slight rental premium to be located in the International Trade
Center. Additionally, the findings of this study conclude that
the direct enhancement to the rental income stream of the ITC
are not sufficient to offset the cost of membership to belong
to the World Trade Centers Association. Perhaps more
importantly, however, indirect benefits of belonging to the
World Trade Centers Association appear to have significant
value.
Thesis supervisor: Professor Lawrence S. Bacow, Chairman
Interdepartmental Degree Program
in Real Estate Development
CHAPTER ONE
In the past, political boundaries tended to separate
economic markets. The movement of labor and capital was often
inhibited by political borders. Religious and ideological
differences typically fueled the segregation of economic
markets. Capital, labor, and goods tended to move only within
countries instead of across borders.
Today, however, one can hardly pick up a newspaper or
listen to the evening news without hearing the term "global
economy." Economic markets are clearly no longer distinct.
Instead, the trend in recent decades has been towards a
closely integrated world economy. Changes in technology,
telecommunication, and transportation have led to
interconnected economic markets. International competition has
spread to national markets for a wide variety of goods and
services. Prices of these goods in one country are commonly
influenced by prices of the goods in other countries. While
there are those who still yearn for a simpler world, the
events above coupled with the historical political changes
occurring in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are no
doubt moving us toward a higher level of international
integration and trade.
Developers and owners of real estate are finding they,
too, are no exception to the trend towards an integrated world
economy. Foreign ownership of real estate began receiving much
attention in the mid 1980's. Likewise, international financial
institutions provide much of the short term and long term
sources of equity and debt capital needed for real estate
development. Furthermore, developers and owners of real estate
are finding that the economic well-being of their tenants and
markets are influenced by international trade and commerce.
One response by developers of real estate to the
internationalization of markets, has been to designate their
buildings as World Trade Centers (WTC), announcing their
membership in the World Trade Centers Association (WTCA).
The World Trade Centers Association was formed with the
objective of facilitating international trade through the use
of World Trade Centers. In addition to the WTCA, a number of
other institutions and organizations have emerged with similar
objectives. Many of these organizations have worldwide
jurisdiction and influence such as the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development. Superregional entities such as the European
Economic Community and the Latin American Free Trade
Association have evolved as well.
Specifically, the World Trade Centers Association has
grown since 1968 to become a network of over 240 member
organizations in 230 cities worldwide. 1 The Association is
dedicated to several basic goals:
1) Foster increased participation in world trade.
2) Promote international business relationships.
3) Encourage mutual assistance and cooperation among members
of the WTCA.2
The WTCA aspires to accomplish these objectives through
the establishment of a network of World Trade Centers. As
defined by the Association, a WTC is comprised of two
components:
1) The building and its tenants, and
2) The trade services provided by the individual WTC
management.
Under the WTCA constitution, one component without the other
is not considered a World Trade Center. Both components must
meet WTCA standards to allow a designation to be granted and
maintained.
Directors of the WTCA Board of Directors note that a
1 "What Is A World Trade Center?" The World Trade Centers
Association Inc. 1992.
2 Ibid.
World Trade Center is more than a traditional real estate
development. Thus, it is somewhat ironic that the concept for
World Trade Centers is based on the historical real estate
prototype for shopping ialls. Much like a shopping mall
centralizes retail activities within a city or suburb, the
objective of a World Trade Center is to serve as a central
location for international trade. The World Trade Centers
Handbook defines a world trade center as "a vast shopping mart
where all the services and people associated with
international trade are gathered under one roof. "3
At first glance, a typical World Trade Center often looks
like an ordinary office building. When programmed correctly,
however, a WTC is much more than a standard office building.
In addition to housing a wide variety of tenants affiliated
with international trade, a World Trade Center also provides
services to assist these tenants with trade related
activities. These services may include trade information,
language schools, trade libraries, and educational services.
Furthermore, a WTC often adds hotel and conference facilities,
restaurants, retail shops, and business services such as banks
and post offices to its real estate program. By combining the
services with the physical facilities, a successful World
Trade Center is a dynamic entity constantly adjusting to
changes in the global economy.
3 World Trade Center Handbook. World Trade Centers
Association. April 1987.
The following paper presents the results of a study on
one such World Trade Center, the International Trade Center
Curacao. This study was performed in conjunction with similar
studies on World Trade' Centers in Amsterdam, Portland
(Oregon), New York, and Taipei. These additional studies were
also conducted by graduate students of the Masters Program at
the Center for Real Estate, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. Specifically, this paper seeks answers to a number
of questions regarding the International Trade Center Curacao:
1) As a result of unique services available from the World
Trade Centers Association, as well as characteristics and
amenities offered by the International Trade Center Curacao,
are tenants located within the International Trade Center
willing to enter into rental agreements on terms more
favorable to the landlord in comparable buildings which lack
these services, i.e. rental premiums, longer term leases etc?
2) Is the enhancement of the ITC's rental income stream
sufficient to compensate the owner/developer for any
additional investment necessary to operate the International
Trade Center?
3) Do tenants benefit from being located in a building with
other trade related tenants?
4) Does the International Trade Center foster regional
economic development and stimulate international trade in
Curacao?
5) Does the affiliation with the World Trade Centers
Association provide tangible benefits to both owners and
tenants of the Internatioial Trade Center?
This paper will concentrate on four primary participants
involved in World Trade Center development. Each participant
has different criteria for measuring the success of a WTC. The
developer/owner may measure success in specific economic terms
such as return on investment. Tenants, on the other hand, are
more likely to be concerned with the services offered in the
WTC or how much their business may be enhanced by being
located near other tenants. The larger region as a whole may
measure the success of a WTC on the basis of how the WTC has
influenced economic development or tax revenues in the area.
Finally, the fourth group, the World Trade Centers Association
measures the success of a WTC based on the Association's
objectives mentioned earlier.
At the core of this analysis is information provided
directly from these primary participants. Extensive interviews
were conducted in Curacao with World Trade Center managers,
owners and tenants. Interviews were also conducted in Curacao
to obtain information on the overall real estate market on the
island. Other entities, though not directly involved with the
development of the International Trade Center, provided useful
information; For example, the Curacao Department of Economic
Affairs, the Central Bank of Curacao, and the Curacao Tourism
Development Bureau provided useful economic data which serves
as a backdrop for this study.
This study is organized in four chapters. Chapter two
provides a physical description of the International Trade
Center Curacao. Pertinent information regarding the tenant
roster, amenities, and services are discussed. Chapter two
also includes information on the ITC's history, ownership and
capitalization structure. Chapter two discusses the overall
real estate market and the economy in Curacao as well.
Chapter three is concerned with the performance of the
International Trade Center Curacao from the perspectives of
the primary participants in the development and use of the
ITC. This chapter also encompasses most of the data collected
from the field interviews and site visit. Chapter three
concludes by addressing the specific attributes which
attracted current tenants to the ITC.
Chapter four provides a comparative analysis of the
performance of the International Trade Center Curacao as
compared with the four other World Trade Centers mentioned
earlier; Comparisons and contrasts among these sites are used
to arrive at a series of conclusions for this study, including
whether there is a specific "recipe" for a successful WTC.
CHAPTER TWO
The Island of Curacao
The International Trade Center Curacao (ITC) is a 15,000
square meters (150,000 square feet) office, retail, and
conference facility. The building is designated as an official
World Trade Center. ITC management, however, has elected to
call the building the International Trade Center Curacao as
opposed to the World Trade Center Curacao. According to the
managing director of the ITC, John Sellers, the choice of the
building's name was designed to communicate the belief that
the building "offered services above and beyond those of a
traditional World Trade Center." ITC management describes the
International Trade Center as the "combination of a World
Trade Center and International Congress Center." This is an
interesting distinction in that many World Trade Centers also
have large conference/congress facilities. Nevertheless, ITC
management was concerned that simply naming the building the
World Trade Center Curacao would label the facility as
primarily an office building. Thus, the name International
Trade Center Curacao.
The island of Curacao is located in the southern
Caribbean Sea, 38 miles north of the coast of Venezuela. (See
Exhibits 1 and 2) Curacao is one of five islands belonging to
the Netherlands Antilles. Bonaire, Saba, St. Eustatius, and
St. Maarten comprise the remaining islands of the Netherlands
Antilles. The Netherlands'Antilles operates as an autonomous
part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Willemstad, Curacao is
the seat of the Central Government of the Netherlands
Antilles. Each of the islands, including Curacao, are self
governing with legislative bodies elected by the people every
four years. The courts are part of the Dutch judicial system,
with access available to the Supreme Court in the Hague.
The island was discovered by Spanish explorers in 1499.
The Dutch captured the island during the mid sixteen hundreds,
only to lose it to the British. The island was intermittently
ruled by the French and Spanish as well. In 1815, the Dutch
recaptured Curacao and it has since remained a part of the
Dutch kingdom.
The island's past has greatly influenced its present.
Tremendous ethnic diversity exists, with over fifty
nationalities living together. The population of Curacao
totals over 140,000 persons, most of whom live near the
island's only city, Willemstad. The island's population has
been steadily declining over the past decade, the result of
out-migration of young people to employment opportunities
elsewhere. 4 This out-migration has been somewhat softened by
4 "Economic Outlook 1992." Department of Economic Affairs
Curacao. January, 1992.
the influx of retirees which has resulted from favorable tax
legislation regarding pension income. 5 Most residents are
multi-lingual, speaking Dutch, Spanish, English, and
Papiamento (the local laniguage). Religious diversity is as
robust as ethnic and lingual diversity, although the largest
proportion of the people are Roman Catholic. 6
Yet another example of diversity can be found in the
architectural genre of the island. Willemstad is dominated by
pastel tints on seventeenth century Dutch architecture.
Spanish plantation style architecture is prevalent as well.
Curacao's climate is surprisingly arid for a Caribbean
island. Average temperatures are in the 80's, and sunshine is
as dependable as the trade winds. Given all of the above, and
the island's accessibility from South America, Latin America
and the United States, one would think Curacao's economy is
centered around tourism. Unlike most other Caribbean islands,
however, the economic mainstay is not on tourism. Curacao has
instead earned the reputation of "the island of business in
the Caribbean."
s Ibid.
6 Maps of the Island of Curacao and the City of Willemstad.
Refineria Di Korsou N.V.
CURACAO'S ECONOMY
The island of Curacao features the fourth largest port in the
world. 7 Over fifty cargo lines link the area with the rest of
the world, bringing an average of twenty cargo vessels a day
into the port. 8 To that end, much of the economic activity of
the island is tied to the port. Harbor activities increased by
4.0% during 1991, and the number of ships bunkered in the
Curacao Harbor increased nearly 5.0%.9 The ship repair
industry remains one of the island's most important employment
sectors. The Curacao Drydock Company has entered into an
agreement with several Cuban shipping companies which
guarantees contracts of over $5.0 Million per year for ten
years, somewhat insuring work volume for the industry.10
Closely tied to the harbor is the oil refinery industry.
In 1915, Shell Oil constructed one of world's largest
refineries. In the early 1980's Shell Oil leased the facility
to a Venezuelan state company, Petroleos de Venezuela. Despite
the departure of Shell, the refinery has remained one of the
island's largest private employers. According to Economic
Outlook 1992, the refinery employs over 1700 direct personnel
7 "Curacao." International Trade Center Curacao Promotional
Brochure.
8 Ibid.
9 Central Bank Study 1991. Central Bank of the Netherlands
Antilles.
10 Ibid.
and over 1300 contractors. 1 1 Despite a steady increase in
production over the past five years, the refinery will be
forced to modernize or face losing its competitive position.
Modernization is also necdssary in light of the increasingly
strict environmental regulations.
Other major areas of employment include government,
community and social services. Two areas of employment which
appear to show promising growth are financial services
(banking, insurance, and business services) and tourism
(trade, restaurants, and hotels). The number of employees
involved in tourism related activities comprises nearly 25% of
the work force. 12 Financial services employ nearly 10% of the
island's labor pool.1 3 The overall employment picture on
Curacao is detailed in Figure 3. 14
Figure 4 provides a good summary of key economic
indicators on the island of Curacao. 15 Inflation has remained
in check over the past five years, averaging between 3 and 4
percent. 16 As the United States is Curacao's dominant trading
11 "Economic Outlook 1992." Department of Economic Affairs
Curacao. January, 1992.
12 Central Bank Study 1991. Central Bank of the Netherlands
Antilles.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 "Economic Outlook 1992." Department of Economic Affairs
Curacao. January, 1992.
16 Ibid.
partner, the island's inflation and economic performance is
generally closely tied with the economic performance of the
United States. The currency of Curacao, the Netherlands
Antilles guilder (NAf), has been pegged to the U.S. dollar
since 1971 at an exchange rate of 1 US $ = 1.79 NAf.
The island's central location relative to North, South
and Latin America make Curacao an attractive location for
world trade. Various tax incentives, the Free Zone, and
sophisticated off-shore financial services lend themselves to
international commerce. Curacao's duel membership status with
the European Economic Community and the Caribbean Basin
Initiative also offer distinct trade advantages.
Transportation, particularly air transportation, plays a
critical role in both business and tourism development. KLM
airlines of Holland uses Curacao as a hub for Europe and South
American travel. ALM airlines, recently purchased by KLM,
offers daily flights to Miami, and four flights per week to
Atlanta. Both KLM and ALM service other Caribbean islands, as
well as Guyana and Surinam in Venezuela. The 11,000 foot
runway is the longest in the Caribbean. Plans for the
improvement of the airline terminal should add extra appeal to
travelers, particularly tourists.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER CURACAO
The International Trade Center of Curacao opened for operation
in late 1987. The ITC's facilities include:
Gross Sq.Ft. % of Total Leasable
*Business Offices 23,000 15.3 15,930
*Trade Mart 54,000 36.0 29,440
*Lobby Shops 2,100 1.4 2,100
*Exhibition Hall 21,750- 14.5 21,750
*Meeting Rooms 60 seats
*Auditorium 325 seats
*Restaurant 110 seats
The ITC facilities also include a post office, a bank, a
travel agency, and a car rental agency. Total gross square
footage is approximately 150,000 sq.ft. including the meeting
rooms, auditorium, and restaurant. Exhibit 5 provides a
floorplan of the ITC. Photographs of the ITC can be seen by
referring to Exhibit 6.
The ITC is located on Piscadera Bay, approximately ten
minutes northwest of the city of Willemstad on the south side
of the island. (See Exhibit 7) Many inhabitants of the
building feel the ITC's location away from town, and away from
the financial district in particular, is a competitive
disadvantage in the marketplace. Most island residents live to
the north and east of town, resulting in a 20 minute commute
on average. While a 20 minute commute seems fairly innocuous
to those who have lived in Holland or the U.S., it is
considered excessive by many island residents. Despite this
fact, however, the ITC's location on the island does not
appear to play a major role in companies' decisions to locate
in the building. Instead a number of other factors appear to
play a more important role in companies' selection criteria.
These factors will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter
three.
The ITC is located on leased land from the Island
Government of Curacao, leading one to speculate that
availability of government owned land may have dictated the
ITC's location. According to ITC management, however, the
government also had alternative sites closer to town.
While one could argue the ITC possesses certain
locational disadvantages, it is perhaps equally compelling the
ITC possesses locational competitive advantages. Proximity to
nice hotel facilities (the Curacao Caribbean Hotel and the
Royal Sonesta opening in October) are critical to the success
of the conference facilities in particular. The ITC is
approximately ten minutes from the airport, roughly half of
the driving time from the city to the airport. Proximity to
the airport is especially important to KLM/ALM Airline
employees who do much of their training in the ITC. Finally,
the ITC offers offices with views of the Caribbean Sea which
command rental premiums from U.S. and European firms.
HISTORY
Initial planning for the International Trade Center of
Curacao (ITC) began in the early 1980's. A group of government
officials and local businessman shared the objective of
significantly increasing economic development on the island of
Curacao. A series of marketing studies were performed, and
resulted in the concept of an International Trade Center as a
catalyst for economic development. The overall objective of
the ITC per its business plan is
"To act as a catalyst for economic development in
Curacao, by stimulating the growth of international trade
and tourism as sources of new employment and income."
The cornerstone in the planned success of the ITC was to
be the "trade mart." The trade mart concept was based on the
premise that permanent showrooms leased on a long term basis,
coupled with periodic trade shows, would draw buyers from
Latin America to make wholesale purchases of goods in Curacao.
Secondarily, it was hoped that U.S. firms would come to
Curacao to buy Latin American exports.
For a variety of reasons, many of which were beyond the
control of ITC management, the trade mart concept proved
flawed. The most serious impediment to the success of the
trade mart was the Latin American economic crisis. Drastic
changes in the importation of consumer goods, currency
devaluation, and hyperinflation led to the collapse of a
number of Latin American countries' economies. These economic
conditions, coupled with the subsequent default on U.S. bank
debt by Latin American 'countries, significantly reduced
international trade to the area.
Additionally, Latin American distribution channels were
well established, and Latin American buyers and sellers
appeared reluctant to change to a trade mart concept.
Furthermore, the ITC found that Latin American buyers
preferred to go directly to the United States to make their
wholesale purchases. Specifically, Miami proved to be
formidable competition for Curacao. Finally, with less than
30,000 sq.ft. of leasable trade mart space, the ITC could not
produce enough of a critical mass to attract the large number
of buyers and sellers necessary to make a trade mart
successful. As a result of the barriers noted above, leasing
of the trade mart space was slow and inconsistent in the early
life of the ITC.
The poor performance of the trade mart had a spillover
effect on the performance of the conference center facilities.
Trade shows were intended to be the anchor for the use of the
conference facilities. Little attention, unfortunately, was
given to the breadth of hotel facilities necessary to attract
a major trade show. The Curacao Caribbean Hotel, though one of
the nicer hotels on the island, needs updating. Construction
of the Royal Sonesta, literally directly across the street
from the ITC, was delayed for several reasons and limited the
ITC's ability to package lodging accommodations. The opening
of the Sonesta in October, and the planned renovation of the
Curacao Caribbean should dignificantly improve the marketing
capability for the ITC.
Thus, as the initial strategy for the ITC no longer
appeared attainable, management was forced to make a series of
strategic changes to reposition the ITC in the marketplace.
This involved not only redefining what the ITC's "market" was,
but identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the ITC
facility. After a detailed consulting study in 1988, a new
strategy for the ITC was developed. The new strategy focused
on establishing the International Trade Center Curacao as a
"gateway" to Latin and South America for European and U.S.
companies.
The new business plan established in 1988 involved a
movement away from the trade mart concept. Ultimately, this
meant a diminished desire to lease space to product-display
firms and, instead, a preference to lease space to
international finance and business service companies. Such a
strategy, however, took time. Many of the product-display
companies had three year leases, making it difficult for ITC
management to shift the tenant mix until 1991.
A review of the current rent roll (attached as Exhibit 8)
demonstrates how effectively ITC management has responded to
market conditions. The ITC is currently over 93% leased. The
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composition of the tenant roster clearly demonstrates the
emerging theme of the ITC's orientation to international
finance and professional/business service companies. The table
below summarizes the comp6sition of tenants by industry as a
percentage of both total tenants in the ITC, and sq.ft.
occupied:
Financial Institutions
Prof/Business/Consultants
Product-Display
Shipping/Freight/Transport
Retail
Training
Government Services
Data/Information
Miscellaneous
# of Firms
23%
18
17
11
10
Sq.Ft. Occupied
22%
18
18
9
3
10
6
3
11
100%
11
100%
As late as 1991, product-display companies constituted
nearly one third of the 71 total tenants. Today, financial
institutions and professional service companies including
consultants, are the dominant users in the ITC. While there
are exceptions, on the whole the financial institutions are
located in the business center space. Companies needing space
for training, business service firms, and government related
20
offices are generally housed in the trade mart space.
As previously noted, Exhibit 5 provides an illustration
of the ITC's floor plan. The business center is comprised of
four stories and offers more privacy, ideal for financial
institutions. The trade mart space is located over two floors.
Corridors are much wider in the trade mart area than in the
business center as the design for the trade mart envisioned
crowded hallways during trade shows. The trade mart offices
also have sliding glass doors. In effect, these offices can be
used like shop space with glass "storefronts" for those firms
who desire visibility.
In summary, the ITC's shift away form the trade mart
concept has been a well conceived and implemented strategy.
According to one consulting study, " the turn from the
traditional trade mart concept represents a realistic
adjustment to market realities. "17  Marketing continues to
play a critical role in the performance of the ITC, and is
discussed in greater detail in Chapter three.
ITC ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The International Trade Center of Curacao is owned by the
Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij International Trade Center N.V. The
ownership entity consists of two shareholders:
17 "Performance Review and Strategic Implications Report."
Carana Corporation. April 11, 1991.
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Island Government of Curacao
Central Government of the Netherlands Antilles
50%
50%
The ITC was completed in 1988 at a total project cost of over
NAf 43 Million (Netherlands Antilles guilders) or roughly $25
Million. Funding for the project was as follows: (figures in
NAf)
Equity capital:
Island Government of Curacao
Central Govt. of the Netherlands Antilles
Debt capital:
Dutch Development Loans/
(Government of Holland)
Island Government of Curacao
Total Sources of Capital NAf
6,250,000
6,250,000
28,254,330
3,143,475
43,897,805
Total capitalization was equal to "turn key" construction
cost. To that end, the 150,000 sq. ft. facility was
constructed at a cost of over $167/sq.ft. Such an exorbitant
construction cost, as we will see in Chapter three, makes
operating the ITC profitably (after debt service) difficult.
The ITC facility is operated by Exploitatiemaatschappij
International Trade Center N.V. Exploitatiemaatschappij is
22
owned by three institutional investors and approximately
seventy-five private shareholders. Ownership percentages are:
Island Government of'Curacao 12%
Government of Netherlands Antilles 12%
Dutch Development Bank 32%
Private Investors 44%
100%
Despite the fact private investors hold the largest block of
the operating company's stock, the three institutional
shareholders, on a pooled basis, retain a controlling
interest. The operating company is also the World Trade Center
licenseholder.
The owner (Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij) and operator
(Exploitatiemaatschappij) have entered into an operating
agreement whereby the operator will pay all principal and
interest payments on the owner's debt capital noted above in
exchange for the right of operating the ITC. Per the terms of
the operating agreement, these debt payments from the operator
to the owner take the form of "rent" for the use of the
facility. The land on which the ITC is located is also leased
from Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij to Exploitatiemaatschappij,
resulting in a similar ground rent payment structure.
According to officials of Exploitatiemaatschappij, the
development loans provided by the government of Holland and
23
Curacao are "soft loans," i.e. there is an understanding these
loans will eventually be forgiven or converted from debt to
equity. Discussions regarding this conversion are scheduled to
take place later this yedr. To date, while rental payments
continue to accrue on the balance sheet for accounting
purposes, no actual debt service or rental payments have
occurred. In summary, the ITC is a government owned and
heavily subsidized entity.
Administratively, the ITC management has organized the
International Trade Center into three divisions or profit
centers. The "World Trade Center" division is responsible for
the business center space, trade mart offices, and the meeting
rooms. The "Conference Center" division manages the exhibition
hall and auditorium. The third profit center is the
"Restaurant" division, responsible for the operation of the
110 seat restaurant in the ITC.
With respect to personnel, John Sellers acts as managing
director of the International Trade Center. Hugo de Franca
serves as assistant managing director. Eldon de Jongh manages
the World Trade Center division. Viveca de Haak and Rajendra
Merien are co-managers of the Conference Center. Including the
facilities personnel and support staff, ITC staff totals
nineteen full time employees.
Management has chosen to allocate operating expenses to
the three profit centers. While this is administratively
cumbersome, particularly as several employees share
responsibilities among the three divisions, it is designed to
paint a more accurate operating picture.
According to Hugo de Franca, management considered
forming two operating ' companies with the separate
responsibilities of overseeing the conference center and world
trade center divisions respectively. It is commonly
acknowledged that the conference center division is the less
profitable of the two divisions. Conversely, the "real estate"
produces the majority of the ITC's revenues. Several existing
World Trade Centers, including Vancouver, have elected to
separate management companies for these two divisions. In the
ITC-Curacao, though it is clear "cross subsidies" exist
between the world trade center and conference center
divisions, ITC management chose to consolidate the two
entities under one management company. This eliminates, to
some degree, the "winner" and "loser" mindset. Finally, as
this study details in Chapter three, the marketing of the ITC
is really the marketing of the island of Curacao as a whole.
This holistic marketing picture also seemed more consistent
with a consolidated operating company.
Finally, the ITC has established a Curacao World Trade
Center Club (CWTCC). The purpose of the CWTCC according to ITC
promotional material is " to contribute to the advancement of
international interests of trade, industry, and commercial
services in Curacao, to further the interests of its members,
and to stimulate cooperation among World Trade Centers."
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Entrance fees range from 300 to 500 NAf ( $225 ), with annual
dues of 400 NAf. Members of the Curacao World Trade Center
Club are entitled to a number of services including
reciprocity at other WTC clubs worldwide, and discounts on the
use of ITC meeting rooms and conference facilities. Unlike
many WTC's, Curacao does not have a private dining room or bar
to serve as the WTC club. To date, only 50 members belong to
the CWTCC, approximately 25 of whom are "complimentary
members."
The highlight of the ITC's first five years has been its
ability to respond to changing market conditions. As an island
nation with limited natural resources, international trade has
played an important role in Curacao's history and will play an
important role in the island's future. To that end, there is
clearly a place for the International Trade Center in Curacao.
In the following chapter we will explore how the changing
strategy of the ITC has impacted its financial performance, as
well as the ITC's impact on economic development in Curacao.
26
CHAPTER THREE
Chapter three details the performance of the International
Trade Center Curacao fromb the perspectives of the primary
participants in the development and use of the WTC. As noted
earlier, the primary participants in the development of most
World Trade Centers are the owner/operator, tenants, and the
Public Sector/Business Community. The International Trade
Center Curacao is, however, somewhat atypical in that the
owner is the Island Government of Curacao and the Central
Government of the Netherlands Antilles. Thus, the primary
participants in the development and operation of the ITC are
the operator, the owner/government, and the tenants.
Financial performance and contribution to economic
development activity are the two performance measures most
important to the owner and the operator. Thus, the first part
of this chapter focuses on an evaluation of the ITC's
financial performance since 1988, and the ITC's impact on
economic development in Curacao. The chapter closes with
pertinent data obtained in interviews with tenants regarding
their assessment of the performance of the ITC.
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
In discussing the financial performance of the ITC, it is
important to realize the difficulty in comparing the ITC with
the financial performance of a traditional real estate
project. As the primary objective of the ITC is economic
development, a significant amount of the ITC's revenues are
consumed on marketing expe'nses. Marketing the ITC essentially
means marketing the island of Curacao to the Americas and
Europe. This is an expensive proposition and makes comparing
financial performance of the ITC with other real estate
projects more difficult. (All financial data discussed in this
section was obtained from audited annual financial statements
performed by Coopers and Lybrand Dijker Van Dien Register
Accountants, provided to the writer by ITC management.)
For the year ended December 31, 1991 the ITC reported a
net loss of approximately 3.5 Million NAf. ($1.95 Million),
down slightly from 1990's net loss of 3.7 Million NAf. On a
more positive note, total revenues (rents and fees) were up
over 37% to 3.9 Million NAf. This is primarily the result of
a significant increase in overall occupancy from 77% in 1990
to over 93% in 1991.
With respect to rental rates, the ITC quotes space cost
on a gross lease basis. ( See attached exhibit 9) Average
monthly rents (NAf per square meter) in 1989 and 1990 were
50.67/M2 and 53.93/M2 respectively. 1991's average continued
the upward trend, reaching 57.74/M2. (This equates to roughly
$36.00/sq.ft. per year) The gross lease quote includes a 9.0
NAf/M2 rate for utilities and 6.0 NAf/M2 for ancillary
services such as security and landscaping. Thus, tenants are
paying 15.0 NAf/M2 (or $9.36/sq.ft. per year) for utilities
and services.
Relative to the Curacao real estate market as a whole,
the ITC has a reputation f6r being expensive. This reputation,
according to a leading real estate broker on the island, is
actually undeserved. 18 To begin with, there is very little
competing product on the island. The only competition
identified by management, brokers, and tenants is a new office
development known as Zeelandia. (See Exhibit 10 for
photographs) At present, Zeelandia is still under construction
with space available no sooner than late 1992. Zeelandia,
according to members of the brokerage and business community,
is targeting larger users of space than the typical user in
the ITC. For example, the largest single user in the ITC
leases only 200 M2, and Zeelandia is targeting users of 1000
M2 and up.19 Space costs in Zeelandia are expected to be
comparable to the ITC. 20 The remainder of office product on
the island takes two basic forms; Built-to-suit owner occupied
space, primarily for financial institutions, and single family
residences converted to small office space. These property
types rarely compete with the ITC. Specific leasing rates for
competitive product were not available for this study.
Several tenants also indicated that quoting rates on a
18 Elvin S. Joubert. Joubert Realty. Curacao.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
gross basis, may contribute to the perception that the ITC is
pricey. As many of the ITC's users are smaller firms, they
often do not consider the costs of utilities and services when
evaluating their space c6sts. As a result, when the ITC's
quotes are compared to quotes for other properties which are
often quoted on a net basis, they sound high.
The World Trade Center division continues to generate the
majority (78%) of the ITC's total revenues: (NAf)
Division
World Trade Center
Conference Center
Restaurant
Services
Other Revenues
Total Revenues
1991
3,059,665
629,078
215,721
7,348
3,911,812
1990
1,965,486
629,901
188,837
39,245
28,776
2,848,245
Operating expenses continued their upward trend, jumping 22%
from 1990 to 5.2 Million NAf. The two major categories of
expenses are organization expenses and marketing expenses. The
following table details the organization expenses:
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1991 1990
Personnel Expenses 1,242,986 1,220,762
Office Expenses 187,287 172,342
Contract Expenses 633,578 630,762
Facility Expenses 2,084,698 1,308,434
Total Organization Expense 4,148,449 3,332,300
Organization expenses were held in check for 1991 with
the exception of a dramatic increase in facility expense. The
large increase in facility expense is the result of buildout
for new tenants locating in the ITC. Increases in this expense
were anticipated as leasing activity was significant during
the year. Furthermore, as the property continues its
transition from the trade mart concept to more of an
international business service center, some renovation work to
the trade mart space was anticipated.
Marketing expenses totalled 802,000 NAf, a 17% increase
above 1990's marketing expense. On a per square foot basis,
marketing expenses were roughly $3.00/sq.ft. Marketing
expenses represent nearly 20% of the ITC's total operating
expenses.
With respect to the marketing expenses, it became
apparent early in the life of the ITC that the project's
success was directly linked to the success of the marketing of
the island of Curacao. Simply put, international firms were
not going to elect to locate in Curacao or hold conventions on
the island if they did not have any prior exposure to Curacao.
Accordingly, the ITC stepped up the marketing of Curacao as a
tourism/convention destination in addition to its previous
business marketing effort'. Such a marketing effort is done
using a series of marketing agents and representatives in the
United States, Venezuela, Brazil, the United Kingdom, and
Holland. This obviously created considerable expenses, but
produced results which were difficult to quantify. Many
government officials and some ITC management considered it the
role of the ITC to market the island as a whole. Others
recognized that the ITC was unfairly bearing the entire
expense of marketing the island.
After considerable discussion, ITC management and
government and business leaders established the Curacao
Convention Bureau (CCB). With funding from a variety of
sources including the ITC, the CCB promotes Curacao as the
destination for conventions, meetings and exhibitions. The ITC
staff will continue to manage and administer this marketing
effort by dovetailing the CCB into its Conference Center
division. The Curacao Tourism Development Foundation has
agreed to contribute up to 600,000 NAf on a yearly basis to
the ITC, specifically earmarked for marketing and promotion of
CCB activities. In short, the ITC maintains the same level of
marketing management and administration but at a considerably
lower cost. Additionally, other public entities have been
created to promote tourism and hotel development on the
island. With approximately 1300 hotel rooms, compared to Aruba
for example with 16,000, the island has considerable tourism
infrastructure development ahead if it aspires to compete with
the rest of the Caribbean'islands.21
While financial statements by business unit were not
available for this study, historical financial data shows that
over 50% of the ITC's expenses can be attributed to the
Conference Center division. Yet the Conference Center division
produced only 16% of the ITC's total revenues for 1991.
The sharp rise in total operating expenses effectively
offset the revenue gains which resulted from occupancy and
rental rate gains. As a result, the ITC produced a gross
operating loss of over 1.2 Million NAf. Adding rental expense
(which you will recall is really debt service payment to the
owner), and the additional debt service on loans incurred by
the management company, the ITC's net loss was 3.5 Million
NAf. Adding back 328,000 NAf in proceeds from the Curacao
Tourism Development Board, and a "loss compensation" of nearly
2.5 Million NAf from the Dutch Government, the total net loss
for 1991 was 738,000 NAf. Similar operating losses in the past
have resulted in an total accumulated deficit at year end 1991
of 10.75 Million NAf.
Summarizing, ITC management has made considerable
progress in leasing the ITC. Furthermore, should operating
21 Hugo de Franco. Assistant Managing Director of the
International Trade Center Curacao.
33
expenses retreat to 1990 levels, the ITC could show an
operating profit before debt service in fiscal year 1992.
Nevertheless, the project is a considerable distance from
generating the necessary cash flow to service debt and make
rental payments. To that end, it would appear the ITC will
remain a heavily government subsidized entity.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
During 1991, the ITC hosted over 80,000 visitors in the
meeting, conference, and business office facilities.22  Of
these visitors, surprisingly only 2,221 were international.
Despite the low percentage of international visitors, their
economic impact on the island was substantial. With average
visitor expenditures of over 2,300 NAf, total direct visitor
spending (hotels, restaurants, entertainment etc.) was nearly
5.2 Million NAf. (See Exhibit 11) Adding an additional
estimated 5.2 Million NAf for indirect spending, total visitor
spending is estimated at 10.4 Million NAf for 1991.
Additionally, the tenants located in the ITC added another 7.5
Million NAf in expenditures. Adding property taxes generated
by the ITC of 1.5 Million NAf, total economic activity
produced by the International Trade Center is estimated at
17.9 Million NAf. Direct employment provided in the ITC is 222
22 "Progress Report 1991." International Trade Center Curacao.
1991.
persons. (Exhibit 11 summarizes the economic activity
generated by the ITC. All data in this section was provided by
the 1991 ITC Progress Report as described in footnote 21)
According to John Sellers, managing director of the ITC,
the assessments of the ITC's performance were varied among the
stockholders. For many government officials, as long as the
ITC can point to economic development impacts, then it is
fulfilling its original mission. Parties in this school of
thought are considerably less concerned about the financial
performance of the ITC. On the whole, these individuals are
pleased with the ITC's performance to date.
Conversely, there are shareholders who believe the ITC's
financial performance is the yardstick by which the project's
success should be measured. These people, in general, are less
likely to refer to the ITC as a success. In fact, according to
one ITC official, several shareholders have already "written
down" their investments in the ITC to zero. It is also
probably fair to say that these individuals were looking at
their investment in the ITC to be much more like a traditional
investment in real estate.
Clearly significant ambiguity exists among shareholders
in both the operating and owning companies. As there appears
to be no consensus on how to evaluate the success of the ITC,
it follows that management of the operating company is
receiving little direction on what the ITC's objectives for
the future should be. This is particularly important as a
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planned expansion of the ITC appears likely in 1993.
TENANT OBSERVATIONS
Tenants in the property are, obviously, less concerned
with the ITC's financial performance and more concerned with
the property characteristics and amenities. Six of the
seventy-one tenants in the ITC were interviewed as part of
this study. Three of the six companies are headquartered in
Holland. (A list of tenants surveyed is provided in Exhibit
12.)
Interviews typically began with a discussion of why the
tenant elected to lease space in the ITC. Nearly every tenant
indicated that they selected the ITC because it was the only
"full service" office property on the island. In the words of
one tenant, "they were the only game in town." Many tenants
indicated they had considered building their own offices or
renovating a single family residence close to town but found
it too expensive, particularly given the option to rent space
in the ITC on a short term basis (less than three years).
Another common response was the ITC's reputation on the
island. The ITC is clearly the "prestige address" on Curacao.
Approximately fifteen specific property characteristics
were identified by the tenant sample. These characteristics
are summarized on the following page. The numbers to the right
of the each characteristic represent the percentage of the
tenant sample that considered the characteristic unimportant,
important, or very important.
Unimportant Important Very Impt.
Secretarial Services 66% 17% 17%
Telecommunication 0 17 83
Travel Agency 66 34 0
Bank 0 83 17
Post Office 0 83 17
Restaurant 50 33 17
Retail Shops 100 0 0
Meeting Rooms 17 50 33
Security 0 50 50
24 Hour Accessibility 0 33 67
Proximity to Hotels 50 33 17
Relocation Services 100 0 0
Parking 0 33 67
Exhibition Hall/Auditorium 50 33 17
Proximity to Airport 50 33 17
Translation Services 100 0 0
Telecommunications received the highest marks in terms of
importance. This is not surprising as telephone service on the
island is slow and antiquated. As the ITC already has the
equivalent of a "switching station" with preassigned numbers,
the ITC can offer telephone service within three days of
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occupancy. This is a tremendous advantage compared to the
normal two to four week wait for phone service. Furthermore,
tenants that need to move in quickly and need letterhead
printed immediately already know their telephone number.
With respect to telephone installation, the ITC charges
a rate slightly higher than the island rate. Monthly fees for
phone service average between twice the island average,
although some users may pay as high as five times the island
average special services. Thus, tenants appear more than
willing to pay a significant premium for the quick
installation, reliability, and flexibility to expand. As
telecommunication services on the island eventually catch up
to the ITC's service this may no longer be the case.
24 hour accessibility and security also were viewed as
very important. Several tenants are open on weekends, and a
number of others have employees who work night shifts. Thus
access to the building and security was particularly important
to tenants.
Parking was considered a major competitive advantage over
competing space in Willemstad. Public parking is scarce in
town, and very few offices have assigned spaces. From the
perspective of both employees and clients of the tenants,
adequate parking is a nice marketing feature for the ITC.
Somewhat surprising were the low marks the exhibition
hall and auditorium received. As the tenant mix continues to
shift away from product oriented companies to international
financial service companies, the need for the exhibition space
from tenants is likely to continue to diminish. This points
again to the need for aggressive external marketing for the
ITC's conference facilities.
Most tenants indicated their decisions to locate in the
ITC had little to do with the other tenants located in the
facility. The theory of "agglomeration economies," or synergy
among tenants, does not appear at work in the ITC Curacao.
Several tenants did respond that they hoped to increase the
amount of business they did with other tenants, but again, it
did not play a role in their location decision.
With regard to the percentage of each tenant's business
being related to international trade, responses, as one would
expect, were varied. Some tenants noted that 100% of their
business was directly related to international trade, with
others indicating that none of their business was
international. Despite the low percentages of international
business among some of the tenants, nearly all of the tenants
commented that the ITC's orientation toward international
trade was important to them.
Most tenants believe they are paying a slight premium to
be located in the ITC building. They seem to justify this
premium on the basis of superior facilities and service
relative to the rest of the island. The fact the building is
designated a World Trade Center seemed irrelevant to most
tenants.
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Several tenants referred to the World Trade Center
designation and services as "nice to know they are there, but
we never use them." There appears to be a direct relationship
of the value the tenantg place on the World Trade Center
designation with the value ITC management places on the
designation. The consensus among ITC management is the WTC
designation was valuable during the pre-development and
initial lease-up of the property. Present value, however,
appears to be held in low regard. One ITC employee described
the World Trade Center license as a "promotional gimmick."
Others concluded more attention should be placed on promoting
WTC services and the World Trade Center Club Curacao.
Complaints among the tenants were few, and typical of
those in any office building. Inability to control the air
conditioning on an office by office basis drew the most
criticism. Others commented that the partitions used to
separate offices allowed too much noise to transfer from
office to office. A few individuals complained that the prices
in the restaurant were too high. Most tenants, however, stated
that the service and amenities offered were satisfactory and
in line with their rental costs.
With respect to tenant mix, individual tenants
interviewed were generally pleased with the tenant roster.
Several firms did indicate that the ITC needed to work harder
on promoting the international flavor of the project. ITC
management continues to change the tenant mix to more of an
international finance and service clientele. The changing of
the tenant composition has been done so subtly that existing
tenants apparently have not noticed.
EXPANSION OF THE ITC
Despite the ITC's disappointing financial performance, a
sizeable expansion of the facility appears imminent. ITC
management has been considering an expansion of the facility
for over two years. Several consulting studies have been
conducted for the purpose of determining the optimal expansion
strategy, as well as estimating demand and supply factors
relevant to the expansion. At the time of this study, a
specific expansion program had not yet been developed. It was
generally acknowledged, however, that an expansion on the
order of 50,000 sq.ft. was likely. Roughly half of the new
space, 25,000 sq.ft., would be allocated to office product.
The balance of the new space will be comprised of conference
center space in the form of an expansion of the conference
hall.
Expansion of the facility is needed for a variety of
reasons. To begin with, the office space is effectively fully
leased at 93.5% occupancy. Occupancy for next year is
estimated by management at 97.5% While specific market
figures are not available, demand for office space is strong.
Zeelandia, the previously mentioned new office development,
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has pre-leased over 13,000 sq.meters of its 20,000 sq. meter
complex at rates similar to the ITC. 23 Furthermore, should
existing tenants desire to expand, the ITC currently has
little space available for' them to rent. This is particularly
important as many of the firms located in the ITC are
"emerging growth/incubator" companies.
As the marketing effort for the island of Curacao
continues to expand, management expects the use of the
conference facilities to increase. The completion of the 240
room Sonesta hotel across the street will allow the ITC to
"package" conventions. Nevertheless, many of the convention
sites Curacao competes with have much larger conference
facilities, more full service hotel accommodations, and more
recreational amenities such as golf courses. Management feels
the lackluster use of the conference facilities by
international clients is partly due to its size. The improved
hotel accommodations coupled with the expanded the conference
facilities, should open Curacao to a larger segment of the
convention market.
Although the ITC has not received formal approval from
its Board of Directors, the expansion is apparently a done
deal. In fact, the ITC recently agreed to lease 7,500 sq. ft.
to the International Securities Exchange Curacao (ISEC).
According to an ISEC marketing brochure "The business
objective of ISEC is to offer a variety of investment
23 Elvin S. Joubert. Joubert Realty. Curacao.
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instruments on an exchange that operates in accordance with
the highest international standards for trading, clearing and
settlement." With more than ten onshore banks and over 50
offshore banks, several of whom are located in the ITC, the
Securities Exchange will be the perfect compliment to the ITC.
It will also serve as the ITC's first true "anchor tenant."
With the exception of Amsterdam, all of the WTC's under review
in this study have at least one anchor tenant.
Critical to the success of the expansion will be
financing. John Sellers, managing director of the ITC, would
prefer to "traditionally finance" the construction of the
expanded ITC. Given the current financial performance,
however, Sellers is quick to recognize that this will be
unlikely without a significant restructuring of the existing
debt. Discussions are expected to occur later this year
regarding the restructuring/forgiveness of debt from the Dutch
government. In the event the debt is forgiven, the ITC would
be in a position to pledge the entire ITC facility as security
for financing the expansion. Another option may be the Dutch
government's agreement to subordinate their first deed of
trust position to the bank providing financing on the
expansion. In any event, however, convincing a traditional
financial institution to lend money with the ITC's cash flow
as its repayment source will be difficult.
The decision the ITC makes regarding the restructuring of
its balance sheet will be critical. In a sense, it is as much
a philosophical decision as a financial decision. If the goal
of ITC management is to distance itself from the government,
then it needs to press for a forgiveness of the debt and hope
to finance the expansion traditionally. otherwise, it would
appear the ITC will remain a government subsidized entity for
the foreseeable future.
CHAPTER FOUR
As noted in Chapter one, this study was conducted
simultaneously with similar studies performed on World Trade
Centers located in Taipei, Portland (Oregon), New York, and
Amsterdam. Chapter four is divided in two sections. The first
section consists of a comparative analysis of the
International Trade Center Curacao with the four World Trade
Centers mentioned above. By identifying the similarities and
differences among the five sites, this study arrives at a
series of conclusions regarding the characteristics necessary
to create a successful World Trade Center.
The second half of this chapter is devoted to summarizing
the major conclusions of this study specifically regarding the
International Trade Center Curacao. As you recall a series of
questions were presented in Chapter one. The second section in
this chapter attempts to answer these questions.
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Prior to beginning the discussion of the comparative
analysis, the reader must understand that the five sites
discussed in this chapter vary significantly in context. At
first glance it would appear futile to compare, for example,
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the 12.0 Million square foot New York WTC with the 150,000
square foot ITC in Curacao. It may also appear ineffectual to
compare the foreign World Trade Centers with those in the
United States. Upon further investigation, however, the
benefits of making such unlikely comparisons become readily
apparent.
To begin with, each of the five sites share a number of
common attributes:
1) The provision of (or access to) secretarial services, trade
information, and translation services provided via WTC
management.
2) Membership in the WTC Club with reciprocity among other WTC
facilities around the world.
3) Courses and seminars on international trade-related issues.
4) Facilities for trade fairs, exhibitions, and conferences.
5) Access to Network, the WTCA's worldwide computerized
database and trading system.
While each of the five sites in the study offer these services
"on paper", the commitment to these services varies
significantly. Specifically, Amsterdam, New York, and Portland
aggressively promote these services, often circulating
promotional brochures and flyers to tenants. Observations from
the five sites under review illustrate the importance of
management's "buy-in" relative to the success of these
services. The Portland WTC went so far as to perform its own
consulting study on which services would be used to the
greatest degree, and whici services would be cost effective.
Based on the results of the visits to various sites, Portland
ultimately elected to offer Education and Training services,
a School of Languages, twenty-two Executive International
Suite offices available for short-term leasing, and several
other member services. According to Portland officials, the
services they offer are frequently used and all are profitable
(one is break even).
Curacao, on the other hand, has elected not to
aggressively promote these WTCA services. Providing such an
extensive array of services is not only time consuming, but
often requires additional personnel expense which the ITC is
not in a position to absorb. Furthermore, it takes more of a
"service mentality" to effectively deliver these WTCA
products. Such a mentality is quite different from the common
"build it and they will come" attitudes of many traditional
developers. The following quote by one ITC official depicts
the prevailing focus of ITC management:
"We're in the development business. We lease long term
space [business center/trade mart] and short term space
[conference facilities/auditorium]."
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One likely reason ITC management has chosen not to assertively
promote the World Trade Center Association services is due to
the fact they must spend an inordinate amount of time
promoting the island of Cnracao. Said one ITC official:
"We have to convince people to come to Curacao. 99% of
the other World Trade Centers don't have to do this. They
can spend a lot more time marketing the World Trade
Center services."
The most compelling reason, however, that the ITC has
elected not to promote the WTCA services is directly related
to the market in which they are located. As the International
Trade Center is the one of the few class A office buildings on
Curacao, it already possesses some degree of "product
differentiation." Superior telecommunication services, ample
parking and 24 hour security further differentiate the ITC
from its few competitors. From this perspective, it becomes
easy to see how ITC management has little incentive to use the
WTCA services to differentiate its facility from the market.
Unlike the ITC Curacao, WTCs in larger markets face
considerable competition. Developers and owners of real estate
projects in these environments are continously looking for
ways to differentiate their product from the competition. Not
only is the number of competing properties greater in larger
markets, but the ammenities offered are also more extensive.
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In Curacao, the telecommunications, parking and security are
superior to nearly every building on the island. In New York,
Amsterdam or Portland, such ammenities are the rule rather
than the exception. For the owner/operator of a World Trade
Center, the World Trade Center Association services offer a
unique way of distinguishing their facilities from others.
Thus, ITC management's decision not to actively promote
the World Trade Center services is not a reflection of their
opinion of the services. Instead this decision is indicative
of the fact the ITC is already differentiated in the
marketplace. The ITC's current competetive advantages result
from its real estate program, and not from WTCA services or
WTC designation. In the future, however, as more competing
product is developed on the island, the ITC will likely choose
to more aggressively promote the WTC designation and the WTCA
services.
As a backdrop for the comparative analysis, it is
critical to understand the specific role that each of the
WTC's plays in their respective economy. On a small island
such as Curacao, the ITC has tremendous potential to influence
the international trade environment. In such a small economy,
it is easy to ascertain that the ITC, the Free Zone, and the
Harbor authorities are the key players who shape international
trade on the island. Perhaps more importantly, it is also
likely that the majority of the international trade-related
activity occurring on Curacao, is occurring at one of those
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three locations.
Like the ITC in Curacao, the Taipei World Trade Center
has become the focal point of international commerce in
Taiwan. When a foreign firm decides to conduct business in
the country of Taiwan, it will almost certainly do so in the
city of Taipei. Accordingly, the ITC-Curacao and the WTC-
Taipei are not concerned about losing a portion of their
country's international trade to a competing city in their
country. To that end, the mission of World Trade Centers in
countries like Curacao and Taiwan is to stimulate additional
world trade. Stated another way, the objective of WTC's such
as Taipei and Curacao is to create a larger global trade
economy for the entire country. For the ITC, this may mean
putting Curacao on the map; giving Curacao an "identity" as an
international trading ground. As mentioned earlier in this
paper, "Curacao is the product" for the International Trade
Center. Similarly, Taiwan is the product for the World Trade
Center Taipei.
As the ITC-Curacao and the WTC-Taipei are the focal
points of international trade for their respective countries,
they are in a unique position to influence trade policy. The
ability of these two WTCs to play an influential role in
shaping trade policy is enhanced by their similar government
ownership. In Curacao, for example, the "economic return" to
the Central Government of the Netherlands Antilles occurs when
international commerce on the island is heightened. Thus, it
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is clearly in the interest of the governments of Curacao and
Taiwan to formulate trade policy which insures these WTCs will
be successful. Also, the government of Taipei is aware it is
generally exporting cheaper goods to the rest of the world.
Therefore, a major component of the Taipei World Trade Center
is exhibition space where manufacturers can display their
wares to potential purchasers.
One important difference, however, separates Taipei and
Curacao. The economy of Taipei is quite large and already has
a sizeable number of firns on the island engaged in
international trade. On Curacao, while international trade is
quite important, it is not nearly as robust as in Taipei. To
this degree, the WTC-Taipei has been able to influence
international trade very quickly. In Curacao, the contingent
of existing international trading companies is quite small.
Thus, a major goal of the ITC Curacao is to foster the
development of an international trade industry for the island.
Though Taipei has a similar objective, the mission of the ITC
Curacao will take a considerably longer time to achieve.
World Trade Centers in cities such as Amsterdam, New York
and Portland have objectives considerably different from
Taipei and Curacao. Granted, the WTCs in each of these cities
are charged with the mutual objective of stimulating
international trade. The strategies for doing so, however,
have important differences. As noted above, the ITC-Curacao
and WTC-Taipei are focused on promoting trade for their entire
countries. Again, "Curacao is the product." In larger markets
such as the United States, the objective of marketing trade
for the entire country would be too broad for any individual
World Trade Center.
Consequently, WTCs such as Portland and New York
concentrate on increasing their individual market share of the
country's international trading activity. In Portland, for
example, the impetus for a World Trade Center occured when
business leaders and government officials realized that
Portland was often losing international business to other West
Coast cities such as Seattle, Los Angeles, and Vancouver. With
over fifty major metropolitan markets in the U.S.,
international firms have a number of locations in which they
may choose to conduct business. As a result, WTCs such as
Portland are continously looking for ways to make
international trade in their city easier to conduct.
Above and beyond the real estate facilities, Portland
maintains two competitive advantages relative to the market.
First, the collocation of public and private agencies engaged
in the facilitation of global trade is designed to allow
international firms to more easily conduct business in
Portland. Permitting agencies, customs brokers, governmental
offices to establish corporations, insurance brokers, and
financial institutions on site truly provide one stop shopping
for the tenants in the Portland WTC. Secondly, the WTCA
services, particularly the School of Languages, distinguish
the project from its competitors. Similar to Taipei and
Curacao, Portland has become the focal point for international
trade in the area by centralizing the firms and services
involved in world trade. Yet Portland's objective of improving
its individual market share in the context of the overall U.S.
market is quite different from the Taipei and Curacao WTC's
promotion of their countries as a whole.
In general, it is more difficult to centralize trade
services in a larger market than in a smaller market. The New
York World Trade Center provides the best example of this
observation. International trade becomes specialized in larger
markets, with firms tending to cluster together with other
firms in the same industry. The "garment district" or the
"jewelry district" are examples of such industry
concentration. Firms engaged in international trade may be
more inclined to locate in their respective "district" than in
a World Trade Center. In larger markets, information
technology and availability also eliminate the value of being
located in a World Trade Center. For example, many customs
brokers who originally located in the New York WTC relocated
to cheaper space as technology and information system
advancements no longer required their location adjacent to
their client base.
Thus, New York resembles Portland in that it has to
compete with other cities in the U.S., for example Boston, for
its share of the overall U.S. trade market. Yet the New York
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WTC also faces stiff competition from the specialized trade
districts found within its own city, an element of competition
Portland does not have to concern itself with. Furthermore,
the New York WTC must alsd compete with the numerous existing
trade show, exhibition, and convention facilities in the city.
While Amsterdam is also in a competitive environment, the
level of competition to date has not been as keen as in the
United States. With the emerging European Economic Community
92, the level of competition is expected to increase. Instead
of competing primarily with Rotterdam, the Amsterdam WTC will
soon be more concerned with Berlin, Paris and other major
European cities as direct competitors.
Summarizing, World Trade Centers such as Portland,
Amsterdam, and New York have the much harrower focus of
increasing their individual market share within their
respective countries. This is not to imply that their roles
are diminished because they are focused exclusively on trade
in their respective cities. Obviously, a city the size of New
York has an international trade economy which would dwarf
Curacao. Nevertheless, as these WTCs in larger markets have
more of a "micro" focus, they are less likely to influence
trade policy for their countries as a whole. Generally
speaking, a WTC in a large market will concentrate on
differentiating its facility, and focus less on promoting
trade for the overall country.
Although WTCs use the WTCA services to differentiate
their projects in the marketplace, a well conceived real
estate program is crucial to the success of any World Trade
Center. In Amsterdam, the provision of Class A space with
underground parking, 24 hour security, and on-site retail and
banking services proved to be a superior product and was
largely responsible for that WTC's success. The large
floorplates of the New York WTC proved perfect for office
"headquarters" and "back-office" operations. The vast
exhibition space and up-scale club facilities proved perfect
for the Taipei market. Curacao's ITC provided the nicest
office space on the island as well as superior
telecommunication services.
Despite certain characteristics which make the Curacao
project the most superior facility on the island, several
aspects of the ITC's real estate program continue to create
problems for ITC management. The excessive cost of the project
led to levels of debt which, to date, the ITC has been unable
to service. The lack of hotel facilities has jeopardized the
success of the conference facilities. The WTC designation,
while valuable to the project in many ways, has not been
significant enough itself to overcome these real estate flaws.
ITC management should consider whether the fact the project's
name does not include "World Trade Center" has impacted the
project's performance.
In all of the sites under review, the affiliation with
the World Trade Centers Association does not appear to
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directly enhance the projects' revenue streams. The
affiliation with the WTCA does, however, consistently seem to
do the following:
1) Increase the project's image, often resulting in the
facility becoming the "prestige address" in that
particular market.
2) Create a work environment more conducive to
international trade.
3) Increase tenants "contacts" in the international
commerce community.
4) Add value to small, emerging growth companies who, by
locating in the World Trade Center, receive an added
degree of credibility in the international trading arena.
Finally, each of the sites under review in this study has
a "deep pocket" investor. Curacao and Taipei, as previously
noted, are government owned. New York is owned by the Port
Authority. Amsterdam is owned by two large pension funds.
Portland is owned by a large public utility concern. Exact
details on subsidies are not available, except in Curacao
where it is clear that the ITC would be unable to operate
without government subsidies. Despite the lack of specific
data, it is clear the success of these projects is directly
linked to the "staying power" of the institutional or public
entities which own them. Interestingly, in Taipei, New York,
and Portland the institutional/governmental owners all lease
significant space in their respective WTC's. Should the
International Trade Center in Curacao elect to expand, it
would appear wise to pursue additional governmental tenants
for the facility.
The presence of additional government tenants in the ITC
could also play a valuable role with respect to "comprehensive
permitting" for companies locating in Curacao. Once a firm
elects to locate on the island, the process of obtaining the
various permits and articles of incorporation is cumbersome
and disjointed. It seems the ITC could create tremendous value
if they could provide "one stop shopping" for permits,
licenses, and legal documents in the ITC facility. Unlike the
current advantages in telecommunications or superior office
space, the advantage of "comprehensive permitting" is an
advantage that would be difficult for a future competitor to
emulate.
While direct government involvement or ownership is not
essential for the succesful operation of a World Trade Center,
government support is beneficial in a variety of ways. On the
"macro" level, the government's ability to enact trade
legislation and tax incentives, for example, will have a
direct impact on the success of any WTC. On the "micro" level
we have already seen the importance of government support. The
Amsterdam project would have never been developed without
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rezoning obtained from government officials. Similarly,
governments may provide support in the form of promotion,
financing, and provision of information services. Thus, while
direct government involvetent is not critical to the success
of a World Trade Center, indirect government often proves to
be beneficial.
CONCLUSIONS
This study began by asking a number of questions. The
answers to these questions are summarized in the conclusions
below. Specifically with respect to the International Trade
Center Curacao, the major conclusions of this study are:
1) Tenants in the International Trade Center Curacao pay only
a slight rental premium to be located in the ITC facility.
Lease terms do not seem to be materially different from the
market standards. Tenants are willing to pay a premium for the
telecommunication services offered in the ITC. Both the rental
premium and the telecommunication premium do not appear to be
related to the facility's designation as a World Trade Center.
2) It does not appear any direct enhancement to the ITC's
rental stream is sufficient to offset the cost of membership
to belonging to the World Trade Center Association. However,
indirect benefits of belonging to the WTCA, which can not be
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easily quantified, appear to have significant value. For
example, project credibility, value in initial project lease-
up, and name recognition value (prestige address) for smaller
tenants.
3) Tenants do not appear to benefit directly from
"agglomeration economies." Most tenants were not concerned
about locating in the ITC because of who their neighboring
tenants were. This may be explained largely due to
technological advances, improved information flow and
transportation improvements which reduce the need for "face to
face" contact.
4) The International Trade Center Curacao is making a
significant contribution to economic development on the
island. One estimate places the overall financial impact of
the ITC in 1991 at 18,000,000 NAf and 222 jobs. As this is the
primary stated objective of the ITC, the ITC can clearly be
looked upon as a success.
5) As touched on earlier in this chapter, the affiliation with
the World Trade Centers Association has provided meaningful
benefits to both the developer and tenants in the ITC Curacao.
These benefits, however, are difficult to quantify.
In conclusion, we have seen there are a number of factors
which are essential to the success of any World Trade Center
development. As detailed earlier in this chapter, perhaps the
most important factor is understanding what role the proposed
WTC will play in its trade environment. This study has also
revealed the importance 'of a well conceived real estate
program. Most of the current success of the ITC-Curacao can be
attributed to the real estate program and associated
ammenities such as telecommunications and parking. Conversely,
it does not appear that the World Trade Center designation
alone can mitigate the negative consequences of a poorly
designed real estate project.
Clearly the development of any real estate project in the
current environment is difficult. The development of a World
Trade Center, however, is particularly challenging. Not only
does the owner/operator have to be sensitive to typical real
estate project concerns, but they must also recognize that
they are often in the "service business." Furthermore,
developers of these projects often find themselves on foreign
soil, with overwhelming cultural differences. WTC managers
are brokers of office space, managers of hotels and
restaurants, and providers of information technology. They are
marketing professionals, developers, and government
ambassadors.
To that end, the development of a World Trade Center is
a unique challenge for exceptional people. Like any
investment, however, the greater the risk the greater the
reward. A successful World Trade Center rewards not only its
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developer, operator, government and tenants. A successful
World Trade Center enhances the entire international trade
community.
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EXHIBIT 2
EXHIBIT 3
Developments on the labor market on Curacao
1988 1989 1990 1991
Number of persons employed 41.329 43.774 45.376 47.890
Number of persons unemployed 13.316 11.670 11.201 9.420
Labor force 54.645 55.444 56.577 57.310
Population 148.099 145.070 143.610 142.959
Unemployment rate 24.4% 21.0% 19.8% 16.4%
Participation rate 36.8% 38.2% 39.4% 40.1%
EXHIBIT 4
Table 12: Key indicators labour market Curaa, 1989 - 199 I
1989 1990 1991*
Employed 43774 45376 47890
Unemployed 11670 11201 9420
Labour force 55444 56577 57310
Unemployment rate 21.0% 19.8% 16.4%
Population 145070 143610 142959
Population between
ages 15 and 64 96218 94819 94129
Level of participation
labour active population 57.6% 59.6% 60.8%
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. Cenal Lbbv &Ftwer - Location of cart
rental. branch offie of the Chamber of Com-
mrce, telephone faclitie and secutv. 3.
2. Trade .\art -Offers 5.400 m2 (58.450
sq. ft.) of showrooms for permanent
exhibition of business-related products
and services.
:3. Curn-o)fice Suites - Fully-furnished
office suites available for rent daily.
weekly or monthly.
4. Shops - Book store. Travel Agency.
and Card Shop.
. Business Center - PL-rmanent executive
offices including staff services. telecom-
munications systems. computer systems.
bank. and more.
6. The raders Restaurant and Lounge -
A full-service restaurant and cocktail
lounge.
7. Confeirence Hall Auditorium - Seats
325 theater-style and offers simulta-
neous translation facilities. stage. and a
closed circuit television system.
8. Meeting Rooms - Meeting rooms
including a media center. corporate
meeting rooms and an executive
boardroom offer the same caliber of
facilities as the auditonum plus a special
mobile interpreter booth.
9. Exhibition Hall - Room for 125 exhibi-
tion booths. theater-style seating for
1.400 or banquet seating for 1.200. Six
freight access doors facilitate loading
and unloading.
EXHIBIT 5
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EXHIBIT 6
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BUSINESS CENTER
TRADE MART
LOBBY SHOPS
T 0 T R L
S T R T U S R E
A V R I L A B L E
ABSOLUTE PERCENT
45 100.00%
67 100.0%'
a 100.00%.
120 100.00%
0 R T 0 N BA S I
L E R S E D
ABSOLUTE PERCENT
44 97.78%
61 91.04%
8 100.00%
113 94.17%
S 0 F N U M B E
R E S E R V E D
ABSOLUTE PERCENT
4 8.89%
21 31.34%
1 12.50%
26 21.67%
R 0 F U N I T S
NON - COMMITTED
ABSOLUTE PERCENT
-3 -6.67%
-15 -22.39%
-1 -12.50%
-19 -15.83%
BUSINESS CENTER
TRADE MART
LOBBY SHOPS
T 0 T A L
S T R T U S R E F
R V A I L R B L E
ABSOLUTE PERCENT
1593 100.00%
2944 100.00%
210 100.00%
4747 100.00%
0 R T 0 N 8 R S O 0 F S Q U R
L E R S E D R E S E R V E D
ABSOLUTE PERCENT ABSOLUTE PERCENT
1568 98.43% 135 8.47;
2638 89.61% 706 23.98;
210 100.00% 22 10.48%
4416 93.03% 863 18.18%
R E M E T E R S
NON - COMMITTED
ABSOLUTE PERCENT
-110 -6.91%
% -400 -13.59%
-22 -10.48%
-532 -11.21%
BUSINESS PLAN 92
ABSOLUTE PERCENT
1,434 90.00%
2,355 80.00%
189 90.00%
3,978 83.80%
EXHIBIT 8
(NEXT 6 PAGES)
BUSINESS
ABSOLUTE
41
54
7
101
PLAN 92
PERCENT
90.00%
60.00%
90.00%
84.42%
I N E S S C E N T E R I,
NUMBER MT2
BC. 1.01
BC. 1.02
BC. 1.03
BC. 1.04
BC. 1.05
BC. 1.06
BC. 1.07
BC.I.08
BC.I.09
BC. I. 10
BC. 11.01
BC. 11.02
BC. 11.03
BC. 11.04
BC.II.05
BC.II.06
BC. It.07
BC. 11.08
BC.II.09
BC. 11.10
BC.II.11
BC.II.12
BC. 111.01
BC. 11.02
BC. 111.03
BC. 111.04
BC. 111.05
BC. 111.06
BC. It1.07
BC. 111.08
BC. 111.09
BC. III. 10
BC. 111.11
BC. 111.12
30
30
30
31
31
31
29
29
29
43
36
40
36
40
36
43
41
34
34
33
25
L E A S E D "
NAME COMPRNY COMMENC TERMIN
Maduro & Curiel's Bank
Maduro & Curiel's Bank
Maduro & Curiel's Bank
Caribbean Rice Industr.
RBN AMRO Bank
Vantage Consulting Inc
Vantage Consulting Inc
Curacao Post Office
Curacao Post Office
Post Office Lobby
SEP
SEP
SEP
AUG
NOV
sUe
RUG
NOV
NOV
ITC
RBH RMRO Trust Corp. JUN
RBH RMRO Trust Corp. JUN
RBH RMRO Trust Corp. JUN
ALM Antillean Airlines OCT
Belien Wansink & Assoc. OCT
Belien Mansink & Assoc. RUG
Nutrifoods OCT
Smith & Partners (Ant.) JUL
Faith Bulkcarriers SEP
CTF Corporation N.V. JAN
CTF Corporation N.V. MAY
Belgian Securities Over.MAR
Propiedades Halabi
Propiedades Halabi
Propiedades Halabi
ODSM Ship Management
ODSM Ship Management
FGH Finance N.V.
FGH Finance N.V.
OMISEC
OMISEC
OMISEC
Driessen Finance, Inc.
Driessen Finance, Inc.
JUL
JUL
JUL
SEP
SEP
RPR
RPR
MAR
MAR
MAR
FEB
FEB
89
89
89
90
90
90
90
92
92
92
92
92
SEP
SEP
SEP
RUG
NOV
RUG
AUa
NOV
NOV
ITC
JUN
JUN
JUN
OCT
RUG
RUG
OCT
JUL
SEP
MAY
MAY
MAR
JUL
JUL
JUL
SEP
SEP
RPR
RPR
JUL
JUL
JUL
FEB
FEB
NUMBER
. R E S E R V E 0
RESERVED BY / DRTE RESERVED BY
92
92
92
92
91
92
92
92
92
*BC.II.9 Smith *Partners (Antilles) N.V. (SEP 92)
* *** **** ***** ******* *** ** *** ***** ******* ** ******** **3
*BC.III.04 Anina H.V./Bekaert
*BC.III.05 Anina H.V./Bekaert
B U S8 II & III
I N E S S C E N T E R I V
NUMBER MT2
"L E S E D "
NAME COMPANY COMMENC TERMIN NUMBER
. "f R E S E R V E 0 "
RESERVED BY / DATE RESERVED BY / DRTE
* PIHNR N.V.
* PIHNR N.V.
* Banrey Banking & Trust
* Golden Tulip Int'l.
* Golden Tulip Int'l.
* Rhold Financieringsmij.
* Rhold Insurance
* Antillean Telematics
* Antillean Telematics
* Carib TeleConsult N.V.
* Carib TeleConsult N.V.
OCT
OCT
APR
AUe
AUG
SEP
APR
APR
APR
JAN
JAN
OCT
OCT
APR
RUG
AUG
SEP
APR
APR
APR
JAN
JAN
*** ** ********************** **** *************************
*************************************m*************
SUPERCALC
File: Z Month Year
Laser: Very tiny
BC. IV.01
BC. IV.02
BC. IV..03
BC. IV.04
BC. IV..05
BC. IV.06
BC. IV.07
BC. IV.08
BC. IV.09
BC.IV.10
BC. IV.11
BC. IV. 12
43
36
40
36
40
36
43
41
34
34
33
25
B U S
ME R R T 8 R 0 U N D F L 0 0 R
NUMBER MT2
TM. 1.02
TM. 1.03
TM. 1.04
TM. 1. 05
TM. 1.06
TM. 1.07
TH. 1.08
TM. 1.09
TH.I.10
TM.I.11
TM. 1. 12
TM.I.13
TM.I.14
TM.I.15
TM.I.16
TH.1.17
TH.I.18
TH. 1. 19
TM.I.20
TM.I.21
TH.I.22
TM. 1.23
TH. 1.24
TH.1.25
1. 1.26
TH. 1.27
TM. 1.28
TM. 1.29
TH. 1.30
TM.I.31
TM. 1.32
TM. 1.33
TM. 1.34
TM. 1.35
TM. 1. 36
TM. 1. 37
TM. 1.38
TM. 1.39
TM. 1.40
TM. 1. 41
TM. 1.42
TM.1.43
TM. 1.44
TH. 1.45
E " L E 
R
N1AME COMPAY -
78 * Radio Paradise
48 * Radio Paradise
26 * Radio Paradise
TM PANTRY
TM PANTRY
26 * Sonesta Beach Hotel
26 * Cronos Containers
52 * Cronos Containers
104 * Sonesta Beach Hotel
52 * Curacao, Inc.
52
104
53
26
26
263
28
50
50
56
53
53
104
52
66
60
50
50
25
25
25
25
25
25
60
60
25
25
25
25
50
50
50
60
S E D "
COMMENC TERMIN
DEC 89
DEC 89
NOV 90
NTC
NTC
MAY 92
MAR 91
MAR 91
MAR 92
MAR 92
* Curacao, Inc. MAR 92
* Curacao, Inc. MAR 92
* E.K.B. MAY 91
* E.K.B. MAY 91
* Trade & Fair ConsultantsMRY 92
* Kompas Business Cons.
* Metalstud Plawa
* HB Management
* Multiservi C por R
* USAMCO / Bares West
* Cons. Sen. Surinam
* C.H.A.T.A.
* Workout N.V.
* Interdec Caribbean
* FEFFIK classroom
* FEFFIK computerroom
* FEFFIK computerroom
* FEFFIK office
* FEFFIK office
* Servisio Na So Ordu
* Caribbean Hail Center
* Mecanica Catsi
* Interdec Caribbean
* E.K.B.
* Fugro Financial Serv.
* IRMA Insurance
* Anglo Suisse Finance
* Digit Vision
* Holiday Video
* I.E.C. Engineering
* Duncan Fransz & Partn.
APR 91
DEC 91
NOV 91
OCT 91
OCT 91
APR 91
AUG 91
MAR 92
SEP 91
OCT 91
JAN 90
JAN 90
JAN 90
JAN 90
NOV 90
JUL 91
JAN 92
JUN 91
MAY 91
FEB 92
FEB 92
NOV 91
JAN 92
JUL 92
APR 91
MAR 91
DEC 92
DEC 92
DEC 92
WTC
NTC
RUG 92
MAR 93
MAR 93
JUL 92
JUN 92
JUN 92
JUN 92
FEB 92
FEB 92
MaY 93
APR 93
JUN 93
NOV 92
OCT 92
OCT 92
APR 94
AUG 92
HRR 93
HAY 92
MAR 92
JAN 93
JAN 93
JAN 93
JAN 93
AUG 92
JUL 92
JAN 93
JUN 92
FEB 92
FEB 93
FEB 93
NOV 92
JAN 93
JUL 95
APR 93
MAR 93
. . " R E S E R V E D
NUMBER RESERVED BY / DATE RESERVED BY / DATE
TM.I.0?
* TM.I.10 Curacao, Inc.
" TM.I.1B Banrey Banking &Trust
TH.I.20 Holiday Video
TH. 1.21 I.E.C. Engineering
TM.I.27 KIN Passage Office
TMI.1.34
" TM.I.42 ISEC N.V.
" TM.1.43 ISEC N.V.
" TM.1.44 XCORP
T R R D E
M T R T F I R S T F L 0 0 R
NUMBER HT2
'L ER E 0 "
NAME COMPANY COMMENC TERMIN NUMBER
. " R E S E R V E D "
RESERVED BY / DATE RESERVED BY / DATE
TH. I.01
TH.11.02
TH. 11.03
TH11.04
TH.11.05
TH.11.06
T11..07
TH.11.08
TH.11.09
TH.1I.10
TM.II.11
TH.It.12
TH. i.13
TH. II. 14
TH.II.15
TH.11.16
TH.11.17
1.1I.18
TH.it.19
TH.11.20
TH. 11.21
BU.1
BU. 2
BU. 3
BU.4
BU. 5
BU.6
BU.7
BU.8
60.9
BU.10
8U.11
SU.12
90. 13
OCT 88
AUG 90
APR 92
SEP 69
SEP 89
SEP 89
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
DEC 91
OCT 91
AUG 93
APR 93
SEP 94
SEP 94
SEP 94
CC
CC
CC
CC
CC
DEC 92
TM.I1.01
TM.11.04 ISEC N.U.
TH.11.05 ISEC N.U.
TH.11.06 ISEC H.U.
TH.11.07 ISEC N.U.
TH.11.09 ISEC N.U.
TH.11.09 ISEC N.V.
TH.11.10 ISEC N.U.
TH.11.11 ISEC N.V.
TH.11.13 Meeting Room
TH.11.14 Meeting Room
78 * SETEL N.V.
48 * Pro Business
26 * UPS / Pro Business
50 * ALM/KLM Training
56 * ALM/KLM Training
53 * RLM/KLM Training
MEETING ROOM H
HEETING ROOM 6
MEETING ROOM F
MEETING ROOM E
MEETING ROOM D
60 # Landmark Real Estate
50
50
25 * Un Ban Karga
25 * Dos Mundos
MEETING ROOM I
50 * RLM/KLM Training
50 * National Car Rental
60 * Manver International
50 MEETING ROOM J
CUR. CONVENTION BUREAU
25 * Dos Mundos
25 * 6rastey Services
25 * Horex
25 * KLM Storage
BREAKOUT ROOM 6
25 * Curcastle Corporation
25 * CARIBCO
MEETING ROOM K
28 * Telelease
28 * Arina N.V.
26 * L.M.I.
26 * Pure Premium Food
RUG 89 RUG 92 ****************************************************
NOV 90 MAY 92 *******************************************************
CC CC TM.II.17 ALM/KLM
SEP 89 SEP 94 * TH.11.18 ISEC N.U.
JUL 90 JUL 92 * T11..19 ISEC N.U.
NOV 91 NOV 92 * TH.11.20 ISEC N.V.
CC CC TH.11.21 Manver International
CC CC ***********Meeting Room
MAY 91 MAY 92 ***** ********** ***** ******** ********
* BU.2 Grastey / National Car Rental
RPR 91 RPR 93 * BU.3 Horex
RUG 91 DEC 92 ******************************************************
MAY 92 BU.5 ALM/KLM
CC CC BU.6 ALM/KLM
JUN 92 JUN 94 BU.7 ALM/KLM
SEP 90 DEC 90 BU.8 ALM/KLM
CC CC
DEC 91 DEC 92 BU.10 Manver International
JUN 92 DEC 92 * BU.11 XCORP
JUL 91 FEB 92 * BU.12 XCORP
DEC 91 DEC 92 * BU.13 XCORP
T R R D E
L 0 B Y S H 0 P S
NUMBER MT2
L E A S E D "
HAME COMPANY COMMENC TERMIN NUMBER
"R E S E R V E
RESERVED BY / DATE RESERVED
37 * Radio Paradise DEC 89 DEC 92
41 * Cur Chamber of Commerce APR 89 APR 92
22 * SEL Maduro & Sons RUG 91 RUB 92
22 * Exotique NOV 90 NOV 92
22 * Paso a Paso OCT 91 OCT 92
22 * Linea Domo NOV 90 NOV 92
22 * Minerals and Gems FEB 90 FEB 93
22 * Cachet NOV 91 NOV 92
LS.04 Maduro Travel
* LS.03 Gift Store
LS.01
LS-02
LS.03
LS.04
LS.05
LS-.06
LS.07
LS. 08
EXHIBIT 9
(NEXT 5 PAGES)
INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER CURACAO
BUSINESS CENTER OFFICES
RATES PER MONTH
SQUARE METER SQUARE FOOT
MONTHLY RENT
ANG USD ANG USD
BC.I LAND VIEW
BASE RENT 40.00 22.47 3.72 2.09
UTILITIES 9.00 5.06 0.84 0.47
SERVICES 6.00 3.37 0.56 0.31
TOTAL 55.00 30.90 5.12 2.87
BC.I SEA VIEW
BASE RENT 42.50 23.88 3.95 2.22
UTILITIES 9.00 5.06 0.84 0.47
SERVICES 6.00 3.37 0.56 0.31
TOTAL 57.50 32.31 5.35 3.00
BC.II/III LAND VIEW
BASE RENT 36.00 20.22 3.34 1.88
UTILITIES 9.00 5.06 0.84 0.47
SERVICES 6.00 3.37 0.56 0.31
TOTAL 51.00 28.65 4.74 2.66
BC.II/III SEA VIEW
BASE RENT 38.50 21.63 3.58 2.01
UTILITIES 9.00 5.06 0.84 0.47
SERVICES 6.00 3.37 0.56 0.31
TOTAL 53.50 30.06 4.98 2.79
BC. IV LAND VIEW
BASE RENT 38.50 21.63 3.58 2.01
UTILITIES 9.00 5.06 0.84 0.47
SERVICES 6.00 3.37 0.56 0.31
TOTAL 53.50 30.06 4.98 2.79
BC. IV SEA VIEW
BASE RENT 40.00 22.47 3.72 2.09
UTILITIES 9.00 5.06 0.84 0.47
SERVICES 6.00 3.37 0.56 0.31
TOTAL 55.00 30.90 5.12 2.87
August, 1991
75
INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER CURACAO
BUSINESS CENTER OFFICES
TOTAL MONTHLY LEASE COSTS
August, 1991
76
BUSINESS I I 1X/1XX IX/XlX IV IV
CENTER LAND SEA LAND SEA LAND SEA
25 m2 ANG 1,375.00 1,437.50 1,275.00 1,337.50 1,337.50 1,375.00
USD 772.47 807.58 716.29 751.40 751.40 772.47
33 m2 ANG 1,815.00 1,897.50 1,683.00 1,765.50 1,765.50 1,815.00
USD 1,019.66 1,066.01 945.51 991.85 991.85 1,019.66
34 m2 ANG 1,870.00 1,955.00 1,734.00 1,819.00 1,819.00 1,870.00
USD 1,050.56 1,098.31 974.15 1,021.91 1,021.91 1,050.56
36 m2 ANG 1,980.00 2,070.00 1,836.00 1,926.00 1,926.00 1,980.00
USD 1,112.36 1,162.92 1,031.46 1,082.02 1,082.02 1,112.36
40 a2 ANG 2,200.00 2,300.00 2,040.00 2,140.00 2,140.00 2,200.00
USD 1,235.96 1,292.13 1,146.07 1,202.25 1,202.25 1,235.96
41 M2 ANG 2,255.00 2,357.50 2,091.00 2,193.50 2,193.50 2,255.00
USD 1,266.85 1,324.44 1,174.72 1,232.30 1,232.30 1,266.85
43 m2 ANG 2,365.00 2,472.50 2,193.00 2,300.50 2,300.50 2,365.00
USD 1,328.65 1,389.04 1,232.02 1,292.42 1,292.42 1,328.65
INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER CURACAO
TRADE MART SHOWROOMS AND OFFICES
RATES PER MONTH
SQUARE METER SQUARE FOOT
MONTHLY RENT
ANG USD ANG USD
CORE UNITS
BASE RENT 27.50 15.45 2.55 1.43
UTILITIES 9.00 5.06 0.84 0.47
SERVICES 6.00 3.37 0.56 0.31
TOTAL 42.50 23.88 3.95 2.21
PERIMETER UNITS
BASE RENT 30.00 16.85 2.79 1.57
UTILITIES 9.00 5.06 0.84 0.47
SERVICES 6.00 3.37 0.56 0.31
TOTAL 45.00 25.28 4.19 2.35
INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER CURACAO
TRADE MART SHOWROOMS AND OFFICES
TOTAL MONTHLY LEASE COSTS
TRADE MART PERIMETER CORE
25 m2
26 m2
27 m2
28 m2
48 m2
50 m2
52 m2
53 m2
56 m2
60 m2
68 m2
78 m2
104 m2
ANG
USD
ANG
USD
ANG
USD
ANG
USD
ANG
USD
ANG
USD
ANG
USD
ANG
USD
ANG
USD
ANG
USD
ANG
USD
ANG
USD
ANG
USD
1,125.00
632.02
1,170.00
657.30
1,215.00
682.58
1,260.00
707.87
2,160.00
1,213.48
2,250.00
1,264.04
2,340.00
1,314.61
2,385.00
1,339.89
2,520.00
1,415.73
2,700.00
1,516.85
3,060.00
1,719.10
3,510.00
1,971.91
4,680.00
2,629.21
1,062.50
596.91
1,105.00
620.79
1,147.50
644.66
1,190.00
668.54
2,040.00
1,146.07
2,125.00
1,193.82
2,210.00
1,241.57
2,252.50
1,265.45
2,380.00
1,337.08
2,550.00
1,432.58
2,890.00
1,623.60
3,315.00
1,862.36
4,420.00
2,483.15
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTER CURACAO
LOBBY SHOPS
TOTAL MONTHLY LEASE COSTS
79
LOBBY SHOPS ANG USD
22 m2 1,430.00 803.37
37 m2 2,405.00 1,351.12
41 m2 2,665.00 1,497.19
EXHIBIT 10
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Economic Activity
Total hosted visitors
Total number of international visitors
Average visitor expenditure per visit
Total direct visitor spending
(equal to foreign exchange inflow)
Distribution of direct visitor spending:
- Hotel lodging and restaurants 60%
- Other restaurants 14%
- Entertainment 6%
- Retail shops 11%
- Local transportation 5%
- Other 4%
100%
Estimated indirect visitor spending
Total direct and indirect visitor spending
82,988
2221 persons
ANG
ANG
ANG
ANG
ANG
ANG
ANG
ANG
ANG
ANG
2,330
5,175,000
3,105,000
725,000
311,000
569,000
259,000
206,000
5,175,000
5,225,000
ANG 10,400,000
- m - mmmmmmm m m - mm m - m - mm m mm - - m - - mm m
Estimated direct spending
of companies in the ITC ANG 7,481,000
mm - mm - - - - mm m mm m mm m mm mm m - mm - mm m mm
Estimated taxes generated
(excluding profit taxes)
ANG 1,557,000
m mm mm m m - mm mm m mm mm mm - m - mm mm mm m
Total Economic Activity ITC visitors
and companies
Direct employment provided in ITC
ANG 17,881,000
222 persons
EXHIBIT 11
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EXHIBIT 12
TENANTS INTERVIEWED IN ITC CURACAO
ALM/KLM Airlines
Antillean Telematics N.V.
Belien, Wansik and Associates
Duncan Fransz and Partners Makelaardij O.G. B.V.
National Car Rental N.V.
Radio Paradise N.V.
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